Mon. May 25th, 2026
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The ruling All Progressives Congress (APC) achieved something remarkable in Edo State: it conducted one primary election and produced two winners, two vote tallies, two returning officers and, judging by the arithmetic involved, perhaps two entirely separate realities. In one universe, Omoregie Ogbeide-Ihama won comfortably with 27,154 votes. In another, Pastor Osagie Ize-Iyamu triumphed magnificently with 33,399 votes. Somewhere between those parallel dimensions lies the actual election, presumably wandering around Edo South looking for a credible collation centre. The Edo debacle is not an isolated embarrassment. It is merely the latest episode in the APC’s long-running national theatre of factional warfare, institutional indiscipline and administrative incoherence. For students of Nigerian politics, this was less a surprise than a ritual. 

 

The Edo fiasco, however, was merely the latest instalment in the APC’s national anthology of disorder. In Ondo, the party transformed a House of Representatives primary into something approximating an evacuation exercise. Suspected political thugs stormed the APC secretariat in Akure while results were being announced, sending party officials, journalists and loyalists scrambling for exits. According to witnesses, the confusion began when a telephone instruction allegedly arrived ordering the process halted midway. The spectacle deteriorated further when committee members reportedly vanished altogether, including the secretary of the primary committee, leaving results hanging in bureaucratic limbo. A governing party had effectively misplaced its own electoral officials. Nigeria, sadly, has become so accustomed to administrative absurdity that such developments barely qualify as shocking anymore.

 

Elsewhere in Cross River State, one defeated aspirant felt compelled to issue a public sermon urging party members not to “burn down the house” over the outcome of primaries. The mere fact that this now passes for statesmanship tells its own story. In functioning political systems, losers concede because rules are accepted as legitimate. In the APC, aspirants increasingly appeal for calm the way flight attendants prepare passengers for turbulence: with forced optimism masking institutional anxiety. This is not accidental disorder. It is structural. The APC has evolved into that most dangerous of political organisms: a governing party incapable of governing itself, yet entrusted with governing 220 million people. It now treats internal democracy as a chaotic experiment. The comedy would be entertaining were the implications not so serious. Political parties are meant to serve as rehearsal rooms for governance. If a party cannot organize a primary election without producing rival winners like a malfunctioning photocopier, one begins to wonder how exactly it intends to organize a country. 

 

This is, after all, the same party whose congresses and primaries have repeatedly resembled civil disturbances interrupted only briefly by accreditation. In Kano, factions have spent years behaving less like political colleagues than rival claimants to a disputed oil well. In Rivers, the party practically dissolved itself into legal confusion so severe that it became electorally invisible. In Zamfara, internal disputes once became so catastrophic that courts barred the APC from fielding candidates altogether, handing victory to opponents without them needing the inconvenience of campaigning. In Ogun, Osun and Imo, parallel executives and competing party structures became so common that one required a flowchart merely to identify the authentic faction of the authentic faction.

 

Even the APC’s national conventions often carry the atmosphere of an aristocratic family fracas conducted with microphones. Governors routinely fight ministers. Ministers undermine party chairmen. Chairmen are removed with the speed and discretion of Soviet officials disappearing from photographs. One APC national chairman after another has entered office proclaiming unity before exiting amid intrigue, rebellion or humiliation. The party changes its leadership with the nervous frequency of a company hiding accounting irregularities. And yet the APC insists on presenting itself as the custodian of national stability.

 

The deeper problem is philosophical. The party increasingly operates not as an institution bound by rules, but as a coalition of ambitions temporarily sharing office space. Ideology is absent. Procedure is negotiable. Loyalty lasts precisely until the next ticket allocation. Primaries therefore become less democratic exercises than exercises in managed hostility, where every aspirant arrives already convinced the process will be rigged unless rigged in his favor. The result is the political equivalent of organized confusion. Electoral officials announce contradictory results with straight faces. Aggrieved aspirants rush to television studios carrying documents thicker than doctoral theses. Party headquarters issues statements “reviewing the situation.” Courts prepare for another harvest season of injunctions. Meanwhile, ordinary Nigerians watch the spectacle with the exhausted resignation of people observing a generator that sparks every evening but somehow remains in use.

 

What makes the APC’s disorder particularly alarming is that it mirrors the wider condition of the Nigerian state under its stewardship. A government unable to coordinate fuel policy now struggles to coordinate candidate lists. A party presiding over chronic electricity failures cannot keep the lights on inside its own internal processes. The confusion at the primaries is merely governance in miniature.

Consider the broader landscape. Inflation ravages households while government officials argue publicly over economic direction. Security agencies contradict one another on terrorism statistics. The naira behaves like a currency undergoing emotional distress. Ministries announce policies only for other ministries to deny them hours later. Even basic governance increasingly resembles a relay race in which participants disagree on the direction of the track. In that sense, the Edo primary was not an aberration. 

 

One must also admire, in a grimly academic way, the APC’s commitment to numerical creativity. In Nigerian party primaries, voter turnout often acquires supernatural qualities. Entire wards suddenly produce Soviet-style participation figures. Aspirants who cannot attract ten people to a policy lecture somehow accumulate thirty thousand votes before lunchtime. Democracy, in these settings, becomes less a counting exercise than a literary genre. Naturally, party loyalists will insist these crises merely reflect the vibrancy of internal democracy. This is akin to describing a building collapse as evidence of architectural creativity. Genuine democratic competition requires credible rules accepted by participants before the contest begins. 

 

There is also something profoundly revealing about a ruling party perpetually consumed by itself. At a time when Nigeria faces economic hardship, insecurity and social strain, the APC remains trapped in endless internal combat over offices, tickets and patronage. It governs like a corporation whose executives spend more time fighting over boardroom seating arrangements than addressing impending bankruptcy. The tragedy is that this confusion gradually normalizes institutional decay. Citizens become accustomed to absurdity. Parallel primaries become ordinary. Contradictory officials become expected. Governance by confusion becomes culturally familiar. A country repeatedly exposed to administrative farce eventually loses its capacity for outrage.

 

And so, the APC continues: announcing unity while manufacturing division, proclaiming order while institutionalizing chaos, presenting itself as the guardian of democracy while struggling to count its own votes coherently. The Edo South primary was therefore more than a local dispute. It was a concise summary of contemporary Nigerian governance: two truths, competing authorities, procedural confusion and a system functioning just well enough to avoid collapse while failing spectacularly at credibility. A party that cannot govern its primaries now governs the republic. Nigeria, unfortunately, is living with the consequences.

By admin

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From Tramadol to Canadian to Exol-5 The New Drug Destroying Nigerian Youths An Investigative Article .From Tramadol to Canadian to Exol-5: The New Drug Destroying Nigerian Youths An Investigative Report on the Shifting Landscape of Substance Abuse in Nigeria Nigeria faces a severe and evolving drug crisis, particularly among its youth. What began with the widespread abuse of Tramadol has progressed through mixtures like “Canadian” to newer pharmaceutical diversions such as Exol-5. This shift reflects deeper issues: easy access to prescription drugs, weak regulation, socioeconomic pressures, and aggressive street-level marketing. NDLEA operations and health studies reveal a public health emergency that threatens an entire generation. Phase 1: The Tramadol Epidemic (2010s–Early 2020s) Tramadol, a synthetic opioid prescribed for moderate to severe pain, became Nigeria’s most notorious street drug. Cheap, potent, and widely smuggled (often from India and other Asian countries), it offered users energy, euphoria, and pain relief — appealing to commercial drivers, laborers, students, and young men seeking confidence or stamina. Scale of the Problem: Millions of tablets seized annually by NDLEA. High prevalence among young males aged 15–35. Linked to increased crime, sexual violence, organ damage (kidney failure, seizures), and mental health breakdowns. Contributed to broader opioid misuse alongside codeine cough syrups. Government responses included tighter import controls and public awareness campaigns, but these only displaced demand to other substances rather than eliminating it. Phase 2: The Rise of “Canadian” (Mid-2020s) “Canadian” or “Canadian Loud” emerged as a popular code for high-grade cannabis (often indica-dominant strains) or cannabis mixed with other synthetics. It gained traction as users sought alternatives or combinations to Tramadol’s effects. This phase marked a move toward imported or locally cultivated premium weed, sometimes laced with stronger chemicals. Youths in urban centers like Lagos, Kano, Jos, and Onitsha embraced it for its perceived “cleaner” high compared to opioids. However, it fueled polydrug use — combining cannabis with opioids, sedatives, or alcohol — amplifying health risks. Phase 3: Exol-5 – The Current Threat (2024–2026) Exol-5 (Benzhexol Hydrochloride / Trihexyphenidyl 5mg), originally a prescription medication for Parkinson’s disease and drug-induced movement disorders, has become the latest pharmaceutical being heavily abused. Why Exol-5? Euphoric Effects: Users report intense euphoria, hallucinations, and a sense of detachment — making it attractive as a cheap “upper” or escape. Accessibility: Sold over-the-counter or on the black market despite being a controlled prescription drug. NDLEA has seized millions of pills in single operations (e.g., 3.1 million pills in Kano in late 2024, and over 5.6 million combined with Tramadol in other busts). Street Names: Exol, Artane, Benzhexol, “Farin Mallam” (in Northern Nigeria). Demographics: Prevalent among youths, laborers, and even psychiatric patients who divert prescriptions. Studies show abuse rates as high as 25% among certain outpatient groups. Health Consequences: Anticholinergic toxicity: Confusion, dry mouth, blurred vision, urinary retention, constipation, and in high doses — delirium, psychosis, seizures, and heart issues. Long-term: Cognitive impairment, addiction, exacerbated mental health disorders. Often mixed with Tramadol, codeine, or cannabis, creating dangerous synergies. In cities like Jos, Exol-5 sits alongside diazepam, Rohypnol, and Tramadol on street markets, easily available to teenagers and young adults. Why This Evolution Continues Supply-Side Failures: Porous borders, corrupt officials, and overproduction of pharmaceuticals enable diversion. Demand Drivers: Unemployment, poverty, peer pressure, trauma, and the pursuit of performance enhancement (e.g., for “hustle” culture). Weak Regulation: Many pharmacies sell restricted drugs without prescriptions. Online and street vendors fill gaps. Displacement Effect: Cracking down on one substance (Tramadol/codeine) pushes users and dealers toward the next available option. NDLEA reports ongoing large seizures, but the problem persists due to high profitability and low risk for mid-level distributors. Broader Impacts on Nigerian Youths Education: Increased dropout rates and poor academic performance. Mental Health: Rising cases of psychosis and depression. Economy: Lost productivity among the working-age population. Crime and Violence: Drug-fueled robberies, cultism, and family breakdowns. Public Health System Strain: Overburdened hospitals treating overdoses and chronic complications. Young people aged 15–39 remain the hardest hit, with national surveys showing drug use prevalence significantly above global averages. What Must Be Done Stronger Enforcement: Consistent prosecution of corrupt enablers and large-scale traffickers. Regulation: Crackdown on rogue pharmacies and better tracking of prescription drugs. Prevention & Rehabilitation: School programs, community outreach, and expanded treatment centers (currently woefully inadequate). Economic Alternatives: Address root causes like youth unemployment. Public Awareness: Honest campaigns highlighting real dangers of “Exol-5” and similar drugs. Conclusion From Tramadol’s opioid grip to “Canadian” cannabis culture and now Exol-5’s anticholinergic highs, Nigeria’s drug crisis is mutating faster than responses can contain it. Exol-5 represents the dangerous new frontier — a legitimate medicine turned youth destroyer due to misuse and greed. Without urgent, multi-layered intervention — combining supply disruption, demand reduction, and socioeconomic support — an entire generation risks being lost to addiction. The time for half-measures is over. Nigeria’s future depends on winning this fight.